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COMPARATIVE LAW
INTRODUCTORY
IN 1957, a subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Exchanges of
Law Teachers and Students of the American Association of Law Schools
recommended a program that was intended to foster international un-
derstanding among law students and the legal profession. Part of this
program included a proposal that law students of the United States and
other nations prepare reciprocal notes on some legal problem of common
interest that would serve as a comparative exhibit of the law of the
various nations.
The Journal's' first contributions to this program were notes on
retailer and manufacturer liability for personal injuries from defective
products in Germany and the United States, and minority stockholder
challenge of majority actions in Italian and American close corporations.
The immediately following notes treat the problem of the motor
vehicle owner and operator's liability to persons injured by the negligent
operation of the vehicle. The German note was prepared by Eberhard
von Olshausen, an eighth-semester law student at the University of Kiel
in Germany. The editors express their appreciation to Professor Hans
W. Baade of the Duke Law School who edited and translated the Ger-
man contribution. The American note was prepared by a law student
of the Duke Law School.
A hypothetical fact situation has been employed to confine the area
of discussion.
-The Editors
TORT LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENT OPERATION
OF A MOTOR VEHICLE IN GERMANY AND
THE UNITED STATES
HYPOTHETICAL CASE
A owned an automobile that was used for the usual family
purposes. The automobile was registered in A's name and was
driven from time to time not only by A but also by his wife and
B, their eighteen-year-old son, all of whom were duly licensed to
11959 DUKE L.J. 93. See Baade, Studenten treiben Rechtsvergleichung, [i959]
JURISTENZEITUNG zo6.
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drive. It was customary for B to ask A's permission before using
the automobile. B was a competent driver and had never been
in any kind of an accident or given A any reason for doubting
his care and prudence.
On this occasion, B asked A's permission to use the automo-
bile for an evening's drive with some friends. A gave B his per-
mission, with the understanding that B was to drive the vehicle
only around town and not on the super highway. B then invited
several of his friends, including X, to ride with him and pro-
ceeded to drive the vehicle on the super highway to a neighboring
city. X was riding with B in the front seat. As a foreign-made
automobile passed them, X remarked: "I wonder what kind of
car that is?" B, the driver, looked back toward the car that had
passed, momentarily taking his eyes off the road. At that
moment the car swerved to the left and hit a car coming from
the opposite direction that was being carefully driven by Y.
Both X and Y were injured in the accident.
Would A and B be liable to X and Y?
LIABILITY UNDER GERMAN LAW*
I
A's LIABILITY TO Y
A. Gefaehrdungshaftung (Strict Liability)
of the Motor Vehicle Holder
Section seven of the Road Traffic Law provides that the holder of
a motor vehicle is liable for damages resulting "from the operation"
thereof. While the minority view is that whether a motor vehicle is
* Eberhard von Olsbausen, eighth semester law student, University of Kiel, Kiel,
Germany.
The form of citations to German source materials in this article generally follows
German usage. For explanation and illustrations, see Kaplan, von Mehren, & Schaefer,
Phases of German Cisvl Procedure (pt. x), 71 HARV. L. REv. 1193 n.ji- (1958);
SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW xxiii (2d ed. 1959). In accordance with prevalent
German usage, titles of articles appearing in legal periodicals published monthly or
more frequently, as well as the dates of decisions, including those reprinted and cited
herein to legal periodicals, are omitted. The following abbreviations are used through-
out: Courts: Reichsgericht (German Supreme Court, 1879-1945) [hereinafter cited as
RG] ; Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen (Decisions of the Supreme Court
in Civil Cases) [hereinafter cited as RGZ] i Bundesgerichtshof (Supreme Court of the
Federal Republic of Germany) [hereinafter cited as BGH] 5 Entscheidungen des Bundes-
gerichtofs in Zivilsachen (Decisions of the Federal Supreme Court in Civil Cases)
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in operation has to be determined according to strictly mechanical
standards,1 the Supreme Court and a majority of authors-more cor-
rectly, it is submitted-apply a test based upon more practical road
traffic criteria.2 -However, since, in the instant case, A's car was in
motion, there can be no doubt that Y's injury resulted from its opera-
tion within the meaning of the statute. The question remaining is
whether A was the holder of the vehicle at the time of the accident. The
mere fact that the vehicle belonged to him and was registered in his name
does not suffice to establish him as the holder, although this does have
[hereinafter cited as BGHZ] iOberlandesgericht (intermediate court of appeals) [here-
inafter cited as OLG] (see Kaplan, von Mehren, & Schaefer, supra, (pt. z), at 1444-
54) ; Landgericht (trial court of general jurisdiction) [hereinafter cited as LG].
Legal Periodicals: Deutsches Autorecht [hereinafter cited as DAR]; Juristisehe
Wochenschrift [hereinafter cited as JW] Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [hereinafter
cited as NJW] 3 Juristische Rundschau [hereinafter cited as JR] Monatsschrift fuer
Deutsches Recht [hereinafter cited as MDR] Juristenzeitung [hereinafter cited as JZ] ;
Recht des Kraftfahrers [hereinafter cited as RdK] Versicherungsrecht [hereinafter
cited as VersR] 3 Verkehrsrechts-Sammbung [hereinafter cited as VRS] (cited to volume,
e.g. i VRS x). The abbreviated citation of legal periodicals is followed by the last
two digits of the year of publication, which in turn are followed by the page reference.
Thus, in accordance with the abbreviated method here used, the German publication
cited at note i, supra, would here appear as follows: Baade, JZ 59, 2o6.
The following treatises are cited by author and page only: BIE'tMANN, REiCHSHAFT-
PFLICHTGESETZ (1956) [hereinafter cited as BIERMANN]3 ENNEcCERUs-LEHMANN,
RECHT DER SCHULDVERHAELTRISSE (1 4 th ed. 1954) [hereinafter cited as ENNECCERUS-
LEHMANN] 5 FiSCHER, GEFAELLIGKEITSFAHRT UND VERTRAGLICHE HAFTUNG (Kieler
Abhandlungen 1938) [hereinafter cited as FiscHER] 5 GEIGEL DER HAFTPFLcHTPROZESS
( 9th ed. 1957) [hereinafter cited as GEIGEL]; LEONARD, BONSONDERES SCHULDRECHT
(1931) [hereinafter cited as LEONARD]; MAuRACH, DEUTSCHES STRAFECHT, ALLGE-
MEINER TEIL (2d ed. 1958) [hereinafter cited as MAUa.ACH]; MUELLER, STRASSEN-
VERKEHRSRECHT (21st ed. 1959) [hereinafter cited as MUELLER] 3 WELZEL, DEUTScHEs
STRAFECHT (sth ed. 1956) [hereinafter cited as WEZEL]5 Wussow, DAs UNFALL-
HAFTPFLICHTRECHT (5th ed. 1954) [hereinafter cited as Wussow].
Commentaries: Citations are to numbered comments to or before sections of the
statute commented upon. In the case of Palandt's commentary, which now is the work
of several authors, the name of the author of the comment cited is also given. ERMAN,
KOMMENTAR ZUM BGB (1952) [hereinafter cited as ERMAN]5 FLOEGEL-HARTUNG,
STRASSENVERKEHRSRECHT (12th ed. 1959) [hereinafter cited as FLOEGEL-HARTUNG]5
PALANDT, KOMMENTAR zum BGB (,6th ed. 1957) [hereinafter cited as PALANDT]5
REICHSGERICHTSRAETEKOMMENTAR ZUM BGB (xoth ed. 1953) [hereinafter cited as
RGRK]i STAUDINGER-WERNER, KOMMENTAR ZUM BGB (i ith ed. 1959) [hereinafter
cited as STAUDING ER-WERNER].
1Roth-Stielow, DAR 58, 123.
2 Constant jurisprudence of the RG and BGH. See, for example, RGZ z6, 3345
id. 132, 2645 RG, JW 32, 7845 BGH, MDR 56, 4613 BGH, NJW 59, 627 (here
probably espousing this view more comprehensively than did the Reichsgericht) ; BGH,
VersR 55, 3455 FLOEGEL-HARTUNG § 7, comm. 45 Boehmer, VersR 57, 5875 JR 58,
4755 JZ 59, x56i ENNECCERUs-LEHMANN 998, expresses no opinion.
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a certain evidentiary value.3 Courts and authors are in full agreement
that the holder of a motor vehicle is the person who has the use of the
vehicle on his own behalf and, in addition, has full access thereto.4 The
person using the vehicle on his own behalf is the one who derives the
benefits from its operation and pays for its upkeep -that is, the person
who has the predominant economic interest in the vehicle.'
In the present case, it follows that A and not his son B is the holder,
although, at least theoretically, there could be two holders of the same
vehicle A has the predominant use of the car; he presumably pays
for insurance, maintenance, and fueli and he has complete power of
disposal of the vehicle. This use and control is a continuous relation-
ship' that is not terminated by the occasional turning over of the car to
B for specific trips, a conclusion further buttressed by B's obtaining A's
permission to use the vehicle before each trip. The granting of such
occasional permission constitutes a special form of control over the
vehicle. This follows from section seven, paragraph three of the Road
Traffic Law, which established the liability of the holder for damage
caused by persons to whom the holder has temporarily given the vehicle,
a provision which would be self-contradictory if the surrender of the
car to others would, without more, result in the loss of the status of
holder. It has even been held that the owner of a motor vehicle who
had temporarily leased the vehicle in exchange for a fixed sum plus
insurance premiums was still the holder thereof, if the lessor did not
contribute to the upkeep of the vehicle other than through the purchase
of gasoline.10
Consequently, a temporary use of the vehicle, such as in the instant
case, without the assumption of any maintenance and operation costs
'RG, JW Pi, 1862.
'RGZ 77, 348, 3495 id . 78, 179i id. 87, 137; id. 91, Z70; id. 91, 304; id. 93 2221
id. 120, 154, 1595 id. 127, 174; id. 170, I82, 184i BGHZ 5, z695 id. 131 351; OLG
Frankfurt, i VRS xioi OLG Hamm, NJW 55, 1162; ENNECCERUS-LEHMANN 999$
FLOEGEL-HARTUNG § 7, comm. 1o; LARENZ, SCHULDRECHT, BONSONDERER TEIL 392
(1956) ; MUELLER 2zS.
5 RGZ 91, 269; id. 93, 2225 FLOEGEL-HARTUNG § 7, comm. 1o; LARENZ, SCHULD-
RECHT, BONSONDERER TEIL 39z (956).
'OLG Hamburg, DJZ 32, No. 430.
TRG, 3W 34, 2913; BGHZ 13, 3515 FLOEGEL-HARTUNG § 7, comm. 18.
sLARENZ, SCHULDRECHT, BONSONDERER TEIL 39z (1956); ENNECCERUS-LEHMANN
999.
9 In the same sense, RGZ 161, 359.
" BGH, NJW 52, 58x. See also RGZ 141, 400; RG, DAR 37, 82; OLG Cologne,
DAR 38, 268; OLG Duesseldorf, DAR 56, 677; OLG Hamm, DAR 56, 113; LG
Munich, DAR 56, 88.
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can neither destroy A's status as a holder, nor make B the holder of the
vehicle.
While section seven, paragraph three of the Road Traffic Law pro-
vides that, in cases of so-called Schwarzfahrt (deviation), the driver and
not the holder is liable for any damage caused by the operation of the
vehicle, this will be of no avail to A in the instant case. Although it
appears possible to regard B's driving the car on the super highway,
despite A's specific instruction to the contrary, as a deviation," a short
history of the instant statutory provision will show that it does not apply
to the hypothetical case. As originally enacted, the statute was inter-
preted to exclude the liability of the holder only if the vehicle was put
into motion without the holder's knowledge and consent. 2 The law of
July 21, 1923, provided for the exclusion of liability if the vehicle was
"used without the holder's knowledge and consent," regardless of
whether such use followed the authorized or unauthorized putting into
motion of the vehicle. 3 Such a use without the holder's knowledge and
consent was deviation by the driver from the instructions of the holder
in such a way as to exclude the possibility that the holder would have
intended to authorize it.' 4 However, the statute was again amended
in 1939 to render the holder liable whenever he "turns over" the ve-
hicle to the driver, i.e., gives him the real possibility of using it.'5 This
was plainly the situation in the hypothetical case.
Section seven, paragraph two of the Road Traffic Law excludes lia-
bility where the accident was caused by an "unavoidable event." How-
ever, since B, the driver of the vehicle, did not observe every care and
diligence required by the exigencies of the situation, i.e., a degree of care
and diligence beyond that which is customary,16 the accident was not
"unavoidable" within the meaning of the statute.
"See RGZ 154, 340. But see OLG Duesseldorf, JW 27, 9zz.
'RGZ 77, 13483 RG, DJZ ig, 598.
"See MuELLER, § 7, introd. comm. III; RGZ t61, 145, 149. An English transla-
tion of portions of the Road Traffic Law as originally enacted can be found in VON
MEHREN, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 436-38 (1957)- Most subsequent amendments to
this statute are recorded in footnotes 20-24 of von Mehren's work.
" RGZ 1I9, 347, 350; id. 136, 4, 7i id- 161, 145, 149.
"See BGHZ 5, 269 5 FLOEGEL-HARTUNG § 7, comm. 48; LARENZ, SCHULDRECHT,
BONSONDERER TElL 394 (1956). Somewhat narrower but, at any rate, covering the
hypothetical case, is MUELLER, § 7, comm. B(I) 62.
leRGZ 86, 149, 1515 id. 92, 38; id. 96, 130 ; id. 139, 302; id. 159, 31z; id. 164,
273i BGHZ 20, 2595 BGH, DAR 52, 1495 NJW 54, 1855 4 VRS 177; 5Od. 329, 3315
9 id. 105; 10 id. 3275 VersR 57, 587i Boehmer, DAR S6, 288-895 FLOEGEL-HARTUNG
§ 7, comms. 25, 33i MUELLER z39.
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On the other hand, A's liability under section twelve of the Road
Traffic Law is limited to 25,000 Marks. Furthermore, he is not liable
for damages for pain and suffering under this statute.'7
B. Liability in Tort
Liability under the Road Traffic Law does not exclude a more com-
prehensive liability incurred under another statute. 8 In A's case, this
would be liability in tort, or, more specifically, liability for violation of
his duty of supervision, as provided by section 832 of the Civil Code.
As the father of B, A was legally bound to exercise his power of super-
vision, 9 and B has caused a bodily injury to Y. A's liability, therefore,
will depend upon whether he is able to establish either that he per-
formed his duty of supervision, or that the accident would have hap-
pened even if he had so performed this duty. Proving the latter will
be difficult, for the mere possibility that the accident would have hap-
pened in any event will not suffice.2" As regards the first possibility of
exculpation, the extent of the duty of supervision depends upon the
habits, the age, maturity, and capabilities of the minor and, additionally,
upon the capabilities and the economic position of the parent.2 In this
connection, it should be emphasized that a very strict standard will be
applied for dangerous activities, such as using firearms or driving motor
vehicles.2 2  This, however, cannot be extended to mean that the occa-
sional turning over of a motor vehicle to an eighteen-year-old minor will
of itself be sufficient to constitute a violation of the parental duty of
supervision, for common experience indicates that minors of that age
are quite capable of coping with the dangers of road traffic. Otherwise,
it would be hard to understand why drivers' licenses can be obtained by
minors who have reached the age of eighteen.24  Furthermore, the
parent cannot reasonably be required constantly to accompany and super-
17 CIVIL CODE § 253 (Chung Hui Wang transl. 1907) [hereinafter cited as BGB].
" Road Traffic Law § 16 (1909). See VON MEHREN, op. cit. supra note 13, at 438.
"BGB §§ ,6z6, 1631.
"BGH, VersR 52, 238, PALANDT-GRAMM, BGB § 832, comm. 6(b) ; RGRK § 832
BGB, comm. 8.
'RG, JW 04, 2o2i id. 05, 21; id. 26, 1149; RGZ 52, 69; id. 98, 246; OLG
Koblenz, VersR 53, 369; OLG Duesseldorf, RdK 55, 123; OLG Munich, VersR 58,
238; LARENZ, SCHULDRECHT, BONSONDERER TEIL 351 (1956); PALANDT-GRAMM
13GB § 832, comm. 4; RGRK, BGB § 832, comm. 7.
" BGH, VersR 52, 53; VersR 52, 238; PALANDT-GRAMM, BGB § 832, comm. 6(a).
"See OLG Dusseldorf, RdK 55, 23.
" Strassenverkehrszulassungsordnung (Road Traffic Licensing Regulations) § 170957).
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vise his minor children.25 All that can be expected is that the father
point out the dangers of road traffic to his son, generally instruct him as
to his duties, and caution him to exercise due care. The Supreme Court
also requires the father to check on the son's driving habits from time to
time without the son's knowledge of such supervision. For, the Supreme
Court argues, even a minor who usually drives safely and confidently
will, experience has shown, frequently be inclined toward fast and
reckless driving.2"
It would appear that, according to the test evolved by the Supreme
Court, A would not be held to have violated his duty of supervision.
'The mere fact that B had, up to the time of the accident, given no
cause for doubting his care and prudence will not suffice to exculpate his
father,27 as the duty of supervision commences before the parent becomes
aware of his ward's lack of care and diligence 28 the description of B as
a careful and prudent driver would seem to justify the conclusion that
this deportment is the fruit of corresponding supervision and instruc-
tion.2 9 This conclusion is further strengthened by the fact that it was
customary for B to request A's permission to use the car, and that A,
as indicated by his reference to the super highway, used these occasions
to caution his son. Consequently, it appears most likely that A will be
able to exculpate himself by showing that he did exercise due care and
diligence in the supervision of his son. A will therefore be liable to Y
only on the limited basis of section seven of the Road Traffic Law, and
not on the basis of section 832 of the Civil Code as well.
II
B's LIABIITY TO Y
A. Liability under the Road Traffic Law
B is not liable to Y on the basis of section seven of the Road Traffic
Law since, as indicated above, he was not the holder of the vehicle.
However, he is liable under section eighteen, paragraph one of this
law as the operator of the vehicle. While this liability is excluded if
the damage is not caused by the fault of the driver, B will not be able
to sustain the burden of proving that the accident was not caused by his
" RG, JW 05, 215 RGZ 50, 6oi ENNECCERUS-LEHMANN 9535 RGRK, BGB § 832,
comm. 7.
'6BGH, VersR 52, 2385 OLG Munich, VersR 58, 238. Cf. the parallel holding as
regards BGB § 8315 RGZ 142, 356, 363; RG, JW 35, 1155 id. 37, 1956.27BGH, VersR 52, 2383 OLG Neustadt, DAR 51, 112.
.BGH, VersR 52, ±385 RGRK, BGB § 832, comm. 2.
10 See OLG Duesseldorf, RdK 55, 123.
VOL. 1960. 579"1
DUKE LAW JO URNAL
negligence. Because B has reached the age of eighteen, his liability in
tort is not limited by statute. However, his liability under section
eighteen of the Road Traffic Law is limited as to amount by section
twelve and, in view of the negative enumeration of section 253 of the
Civil Code, he is not liable for damages for pain and suffering under the
Road Traffic Law.
B. Liability in Tort
According to sections sixteen and eighteen, paragraph two of the
Road Traffic Law, liability thereunder does not preclude a greater lia-
bility under another statutory provision. In the instant case, it is clear
that B has committed a tort against Y within the purview of section 823
of the Civil Code. B took his eyes off the road only momentarily, but
this is, especially on a super highway, plainly negligence as defined by
the Civil Code, i.e., the nonobservance of customary care and diligence, 30
which can be expected to cause accidents resulting in damage. The same
liability is incurred under section 823, paragraph two of the Civil Code
in conjunction with either section one of the Road Traffic Regulations31
or section 230 of the Penal Code, both of which are protective statutes
within the meaning of section 823. B's liability under section 823 is not
limited as to amount, and he is liable in damages for pain and suffering.a2
C. Mitigation Because of Betriebsgefahr (Inherent Danger)
Since Y was also driving a motor vehicle at the time of the accident,
the question arises whether his recovery from A and B is reduced be-
cause he, too, was operating a dangerous instrumentality. The provi-
sion in point is section seventeen of the Road Traffic Law, which is a
special rule for the application of the comparative negligence rule for-
mulated in section 254 of the Civil Code and which precludes the appli-
cation of this latter section.3 Section seventeen of the Road Traffic Law
provides, in substance, that if, in a collision of motor vehicles, one of the
vehicle holders suffers damages, and the holders are legally liable to
each other, the extent of the damages which one or more of them will
have to pay is contingent upon the degree to which the damage was
caused by the various parties. Section eighteen of the law extends this
principle to motor vehicle operators.
30 See BGB § 276.
8' OLG Bamberg, DAR 53, 33.
" See BGB § 847.
" RG, JW 37, 1312; RG, DAR 38, 270; FLOEGEL-HARTUNG § 17, comm. 2;
Rauschert, NJW 54, 704; Stueckrath, JR 52, 154.
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If Y was only the operator of the vehicle, there would be no miti-
gation in damages. For the reference in section eighteen to section
seventeen indicates that the mitigation rule applies only if the person
damaged would, had not he but a third party been injured, be liable to
such a third person. 4 Since strict liability exists only as to holders and
not as to operators, and since Y will easily sustain the burden of proving
that he was not negligent, he is not obliged to suffer a reduction in his
recovery if he was only the operator, not the holder, of the vehicle.
If Y were the holder, however, the result would be different. While
the question is still quite controversial, it seems firmly established in the
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court,," followed by other courts3 6 and
by several authors,37 that the recovery of damages in motor vehicle
accident cases can be reduced by taking into account the Betriebsgefazr,
i.e., the typical danger inherent in the vehicle of the victim even in the
absence of any fault on his part. While the pre-1945 Supreme Court
had permitted such a reduction only as between parties both of whom
were without negligence and merely liable to each other on the basis of
strict liability,38 it had permitted an exception to this restrictive rule if
there was any negligence, however slight, on the part of the victim, as
well as on the part of the principal wrongdoer. The recovery of the
former was consequently reduced by (a) his contributory negligence,
and (b) his Betriebsgefahr.39 From here it was only a short step to the
realization that liability for Betriebsgefahr is not an exceptional obliga-
tion, but a natural concomitant of the machine age, and that there is
'little justice in denying a reduction of recovery to the party who, while
only slightly negligent, drives a comparatively innocuous vehicle, as
against someone who, while technically without fault, is responsible for
the operation of a vehicle with substantial inherent danger, such as a
multiple-trailer truck. 40
"This would seem to be quite uncontested. See BGHZ 2o, 259; FLOEGEL-HARTUNG
§ 17, comm. x6. MUELLER § 17, comm. 6(11) (b) 5 id. § 7(I), introd. B.
"BGHZ 6, x395 id. 20, z595 BGH, DAR 53, 94.; id. 55, 1355 id. 54, 14i 9 VRS
89, 427.
30OLG Stuttgart, NJW 5o, 545; OLG Hamburg, VersR 54, 655 OLG Bremen,
DAR 5z, 575 OLG Duesseldorf, RdK 55, 1245 OLG Oldenburg, DAR 53, 96; id. 56,
1z95 LG Aachen, 9 VRS 241.
"'LARENZ, SCHULDRECHT, ALLGEMEINER TEIL Iz5 n.i (x953)5 GEIGEL 1355
MUELLER 378 5 PALANDT-DANCKELMANN BGB § 254, comm. 2 (a); Gelhaar, DAR 54,
z675 Rauschert, NJW 54, 7045 Voss, VersR 52, 376.
"'RGZ 67, 120i id. 114, 76i id. 129, 59i id. 164, 269; RG, JW 37, z6485 id. 38,
3052; Deutsches Recht 39, 1079.
" RG, JW 37, 2648; 38, 3052. See Boehmer, VersR 57, 347.
'o BGHZ 20, 259.
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Even if Y's Betriebsgefahr as a holder is considered by way of miti-
gation, however, this does not necessarily mean that his recovery will be
reduced. For, as indicated above, strict liability based upon the Betriebs-
gefahr borne by the holder of a vehicle exists only for accidents not,
caused by an unavoidable event. The test for determining whether the
event was in fact avoidable is, of course, very strict; and it has been
rightly and repeatedly held that faulty driving on the part of the
wrongdoer does not necessarily make the accident unavoidable as regards
the victim, as he could have foreseen, and properly reacted to, such
faulty driving.41 However, where there is no prior indication of faulty
driving at all, the accident caused by a seemingly well-driven car's
sudden deviation into oncoming traffic has rightly been held not only by
the Supreme Court,42 but also by several other courts,43 to be entirely
unavoidable as regards the unsuspecting victim on the other side of the
road.
It follows that Y's recovery from A and B will not be reduced by
his own Betriebsgefahr, regardless of whether or not he is the holder of
the vehicle that he was driving.
III
A's LIABILITY TO X
A is not liable to X as the holder of the vehicle because X did not
pay for his transportation, and neither A nor B was engaged in the
commercial transportation of passengers. Unless both of these condi-
tions are met, section 8(a) of the Road Traffic Law excludes the strict
liability of the holder to persons riding in his vehicle. Furthermore, A
is not liable to X in tort, for, as has been pointed out above, he did not
violate his duty of parental supervision over B, and is not otherwise at
fault.
A's liability to X could, therefore, be based only upon a contractual
relationship in which B figures as A's agent and A is liable for B's torts
under section 278 of the Civil Code. Such a contractual relationship,
however, does not exist in the instant case. There was neither any
understanding between A and X in connection with the automobile trip
undertaken by B, nor any indication that A had authorized B to enter
into a gratuitous transportation contract with X on behalf of A. The
"'BGH, DAR 5z, 149; id. 55, 194; 5 VRS 329 RGZ 162, i, 3; x64, 273 280;
FLOEGEL-HARTUNG § 7(1), comm. 33.
o VRS 172. Cf. ro VRS 327.
,OLG Munich, Hoechstrichterliche Rechtsprechung 4 z, No. 43 5 LG Duesseldorf,
VersR 55, 6o6; LG Paderborn, VersR 55, 6o6.
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assumption of an implied authorization for the making of such a contract
can only be based upon unequivocal evidence.4"
Even if B had been authorized by A to take guests with him and had
informed X of this authorization, and even if X had, at least tacitly,
declared his acceptance of a gratuitous transportation agreement, this
would not suffice to establish a contractual relationship between A and
X. A's action would signify nothing more than his assent as a parent
and as the owner of the vehicle to the performance of a gratuitous trans-
portation contract between B and X, not between himself and X. Mani-
festly, parental authorization or ratification of the contracts of minors
does not establish a contractual relationship between the parent and the
third party.
IV
B's LIABILITY TO X
A. Contractual Liability
There is an additional reason for denying the existence of a contrac-
tual relationship. Since this is of importance to the relationship be-
tween B and X as well as A and X, it will be examined here. The legal
relationship between the parties is based upon a so-called Gefaellig-
keitsfahrt, i.e., the gratuitous transportation of another person in a motor
vehicle without some benefit to the driver.45 Such a Gefaelligkeitsfahrt
is a factual relation which lies outside the scope of legally relevant acts-
particularly contracts-and constitutes a gratuitous social relationship
rather than a gratuitous contract.4" A legal relationship, and more
particularly a contract, can only be based upon the intention of the par-
ties to establish a legal obligation.47 Whether such an intention exists
depends upon the particular fact situation, especially the nature and
" OLG Bamberg, NJW 49, 5o65 OGH (formerly Supreme Court for the British
Zone), 3 VRS 15, i,.
"This is the definition of that term by Guelde, Deutsches Recht 39, 1420. See
also FLOECEL-HARTUNG § 8(a), comm. 6.
*"This is undisputed. RGZ 65, 18; id. 65, 315S id. xz8, 229, 231; id. 41i, z6zi
RG, JW 34, 2033i id. 35, 1021; id. 37, 14905 BGH, DAR 58, 2135 OLG Tuebingen,
DAR 51, 178; OLG Karlsruhe, Hoechstrichterliche Rechtsprechung 35, 683; OLG
Naumburg, RdK 3, 2415 OLG Bamberg, NJW 49, 5075 OLG Duesseldorf, RdK 5o,
76; ENNECCERUS-LEHMANN i ooo-o 1; FLOEGEL-HARTUNG § 8 (a), comm. 6; MUELLER
297; PALANDT-DANCKELMANN § 241, introd. 2; id. BGE § 254, comm. 6; Wussow 458;
Goetz & Boehmer, DAR 57, 228-29; Boehmer, JR 57, 338-39; Arndt, JW 29, 898;
Carl, JW 37, 1633; Louis, JW 35, oz; Josef, Jw z8, z31o; Guelde, JW 36, 1584;
and Deutsches Recht 39, 1420; Koch, JW 31, 3301; Groebe, JW 36, 15 8tff. A dif-
ferent definition is seemingly advocated by Volkmann, JW 34, 346-47.
4 TBGHZ 21, 102; OGH 3 VRS 15, 19; ENNECCERUs-LEHMANN 114.
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purpose of the relationship, its economic significance, particularly for
the person favored, and his discernible interest in the realization of the
relationship.4" According to the test here set out, the assumption of a
legal obligation must be denied in the instant case. Whether B under-
took the pleasure drive which he planned and whether he took his friends
with him was of no economic or legal significance for the latter, whose
interest in the trip remained purely social.49 It was manifestly not the
intention of the parties to create a right on the part of the guests to
transportation in A's car by B and a corresponding duty of B (or A) to
make reparation in case of nonperformance.
The Supreme Court, however, has recently decided that the absence
of a legal duty of performance will not necessarily exclude the legal
relevance of a gratuitous obligation. In essence, the Court held that
even if there is no obligation to perform, voluntary performance will
nevertheless give rise to a legal relationship with concomitant con-
tractual duties of due care and diligence. Thus, the Court created a new
type of obligation: a contract without the duty of performance but with
the duty of due care and diligence, a subspecies of a "contract giving rise
to protective duties towards third persons."'" Even this new legal con-
cept, however, would not cover the instant case. In the case decided by
the Supreme Court, a firm employing a driver had permitted his tem-
porary employment by a transport firm whose driver had suddenly died,
and which needed a driver immediately for the fulfillment of a trans-
port contract previously concluded. The Supreme Court placed special
emphasis upon the fact that the relationship concerned the economic
and business interest of both parties, and that the defendant was to aid
the plaintiff in a business emergency. Even a quasi-contractual relation-
ship without the obligation of performance, but with the obligation of
due care and diligence in case of performance, the Court held, has to be
founded on economic and business considerations. It specifically indi-
'
8 RG, Leipziger Zeitschrift 18, 496i id. 1923, 2755 RGZ 151, 203, 7o85 BGHZ zi,
o2; ERmAN, BGB § 24I, 2x introd. comm. ii(b). PALANDT-DANCKELMANN, BGR
§ 241, 2x introd. comm. z.
" The situation would have been different if B had promised to take his friend to
the station because his friend was planning an important business trip. To the same
effect, see MUELLER 297.
'
0BGHZ 21, io2.
51BGH, JZ 6o, 124, discussed by Lorenz, JZ 6o, xo8j GERNHUBER, DRIr"iVIR-
KUNGEN IM SCHULDVERHAELTNIS KRAFT LEISTUNGSNAEHE, FESTsCHRIFT FUER ARTHU&
NIKISCH 249 (1958) ; LARENZ, SCHULDRECHT ALLGEMEINER TEIL 139 (1953).
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cated that mere gratuitous acts of kindness in social life rather than in
business life would not create such an obligation. 52
Therefore, it follows that A is not liable to X at all, and that B is
not liable to him in contract.
B. Liability in Tort
B is not liable to X in tort on the basis of section eighteen of the
Road Traffic Law as the operator of the vehicle, as the exception of
section 8(a) of the same law for gratuitous and noncommercial riders
also applies to the operator's liability.5 3  However, B has committed a
tort resulting in bodily injury to X, just as he has committed a similar
tort against Y. The only question is whether, as against a gratuitous
guest and in view of the special fact situation here presented, his liability
to X is either diminished or excluded.
x. A lesser standard of care toward gratuitous guests?
It is sometimes asserted either that the motor vehicle operator's
liability to gratuitous guests is limited to gross negligence, or that the
standard of care is diligentia quam in suis, that is, the same degree of
prudence and care as the operator applies in his own affairs.54 How-
ever, the courts have consistently held,55 and most authors have main-
tained,5" that, in principle, the operator is liable for all negligent acts
toward gratuitous guests. The latter, it is submitted, is the preferable
view.
The contrary opinion proceeds mainly by analogy from sections 521,
599, and 69o of the Civil Code, which limit the donor's, the gratuitous
1 BGH zi, 1o, 107; BGH, VersR 58, 377. To the same effect, see MUELLER. 297.
FLOEGEL-HARTUNG § 8(a), comm. 5; LG Freiburg, VersR 58, 439i Arbeits-
gericht (Labor Court) Augsburg, VersR 58, 496.
"'ENNECCFRUS-LEHMANN x14; Groebe, JW 36, 1581, 1584; Loehlein, Zeitschrift
fuer das gesamte Handels-und Konkursrecht 36, 297, and JR So, 132; Stienen, Deutsches
Recht 40, 4z6; Beitzke, MDR 58, 678; FISCHER, passim; OLG Munich, Leipziger
Zeitschrift 17, 137 o. Louis, JW 35, 1023; id. 36, 425, would exclude liability for
gross negligence as well. However, he resorts to political terms rather than legal argu-
ments. The question is left open in RG Leipziger Zeitschrift 18, 496, and RGZ 65, 17.
But see note 58 infra.
&SRGZ 45, 394; J3W 32, 1025; id. 34, 2033; id. 35, 1oz; id. 36, 189o; id. 3%
482; BGH, VersR 55, 309; id. 56, 388; id. 56, 589; id. 57, 299; d. 57, 718; id. 58,
309; id. 58, 377; OGH 3 VRS iS; OLG Kiel, Hoechstrichterliche Rechtsprechung 38,
No. x590; OLG Tuebingen, DAR 51, 178; 5z, 6; OLG Bamberg, DAR 53, 33; OLG
Munich, VersR 58, 459; OLG Stuttgart, VersR 58, 473.
" PALANDT-GRAMM, BGB § 8z3, introd. 3 (b); FLOEGEL-HARTUNG § 8(a), comm.
6; MUELLER 298; Boehmer, JR 57, 338-39; Guelde, JW 36, x584 and Deutsches Recht,
39, 14zo. LARENZ, SCHULDRECHT, ALLGEMEINER TEIL 163 (1953), left the question
undecided, but adopted to the dominant trend in Schuldrecht Bonsonderer Teil.
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bailor's, and the gratuitous bailee's responsibility for negligence to gross
negligence or diligentia quiam in suis.57 One difference between these
legal relationships and the present fact situation is that, in the former,
there is a legal obligation to be performed; the limitation of the munifi-
cent person's liability might justly be regarded as a kind of equivalent
for his obligation to act without economic benefit to himself."' This
would justify a lesser standard of care for gratuitous transportation con-
tracts as distinguished from gratuitous transportation relationships-that
is, unenforceable social "promises." However, even this restrictive view
of a limited standard of care in gratuitous transportation cases would
seem to overlook the fact that violation of the legal obligations of the
gratuitous lender, bailee, and donor, be it through nonperformance, "posi-
tive violation of contract, '59 promise of a thing impossible to perform,
or otherwise, will in practically all cases result in mere property damage
as distinguished from personal injuries. Conversely, accidents caused
through the operator's negligence in the course of gratuitous transpor-
tation will result primarily in personal injuries. The rules established
by the Civil Code for property damage need not necessarily be appli-
cable by analogy to personal injury cases.
That such an analogy is not permissible is convincingly demonstrated
by the fact that both the gratuitous agent and, in principle, the nego-
tiorum gestor° are liable for all their acts of negligence although they
are acting gratuitously. It would seem clear that, as the Civil Code
lays down a lesser standard of care for gratuitous conferrals of property
benefits, but applies the ordinary standard of negligence to gratuitious
conferrals of personal services, the analogy, if any, therefore will have
to be drawn to the latter and not to the former." The oft-mentioned
"gift" of gasoline and "loan" of the car 2 would appear to be substan-
tially outweighed by the importance of the personal services of the
" This argument is advanced especially by Loehlein, Stienen, and Enneccerus-
Lehmann, supra note 54, and Zimmermann, JW 2S, 1717. This view is combated by
Maier, Deutscbes Recht 39, 1417, 1419.
"Therefore, Boebmer, JR 57, 338, and OLG Naumburg, RdK 31, 241 would apply
a lesser standard of care only in the case of gratuitious transportation contracts. This
would also seem to have been the view of the Supreme Court in RGZ 65, 17, and
Leipziger Zeitschrift 18, 496.
"As to "positive violations of contracts," see Comment, 1959 DUKE L.J. 94, 96.
6 Sections 66z, 276; arg. e. contrario BGB § 68o; see PALANDT-GRAMM, BGB
§ 662, comm. 4(a).
61 OGH 3, VRS 15, 19.
82Relied upon by OLG Munich, Keipziger Zeitschrift 17, 1370; OLG Naumburg,
RdK 31, 24z Zimmermann, JW 28, 1717.
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driver. This is all the more so in the present case, where the operator
has neither purchased the gasoline nor owns the car.
It is further argued, by Zimmermann 3 and now especially by
Beitzke,6 4 that it would be unjust and contrary to the intention of the
parties to burden the driver who is transporting a passenger gratuitously
with a greater degree of care and diligence than he would have to prac-
tice if he were driving alone. But, while a person driving alone en-
dangers mainly himself, a person who accepts riders is charged with the
duty to look out for others as well: He will therefore have to exercise
customary care and prudence. 5 If the driver does not desire to assume
this responsibility, he must expressly repudiate it. That it is not un-
reasonable to saddle the driver of a car with the ordinary degree of care
and prudence toward his gratuitous guests, is further illustrated by the
obvious fact that, as against all third parties, he has to exercise the same
degree of care and prudence.
If Professor Beitzke argues that the guest is well-aware of the in-
herent dangers in motor traffic and accordingly assumes a corresponding
risk, he would seem to overlook the fact that the legislature has recog-
nized the validity of this argument only for purposes of the absolute
liability of the motor vehicle holder. 6 This principle does not lend
itself to analogy, as negligence in road traffic is not a normal danger that
the guest will have to take into consideration. 7 It appears quite per-
missible, on the contrary, to rebut Professor Beitzke's view by arguing
e contrario from section 8(a) of the Road Traffic Laws.
A further argument advanced by Professor Beitzke is that while, in
the case of an accident involving third parties, the wrongdoer invades
the Rechtssphaere ("realm") of such third parties, the gratuitous guest
by his own acts has voluntarily placed himself in the "realm" of the
driver and will therefore have to take the latter's care and prudence as
he finds it. s This line of reasoning would appear to be quite dangerous,
as unsettling well-established rules of liability in a number of typical
fact situations, as where a person enters the house of another. It is
well-settled that all property owners who, for whatever reason, permit
"JW 28, 1717.
o14 MDR 58, 678.
" This is properly emphasized by Boehmer, VersR 58, 66z, and Guelde, JW 36,
1584-85, and Deutsches Recht 39, 142o-zE.
66 Road Traffic Law § 8(a) (i9o9).
1Bochmer, MDR 58, 896; OLG Naumburg, RdK 31, 241.
', Supra note 64.
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the use of their property by the public are fully responsible for the
safety of passage. 9
Finally, it is occasionally argued that the responsibility of motor
vehicle operators to gratuitous guests should be decreased because both
are in the same "community of danger." This line of reasoning need
not be discarded a limine in view of its rather obvious ideological roots
in the all-too-recent past, for the community of interest or of danger is
a legal principle of quite reputable lineage.7 0  Even a bowdlerized view
of the arguments advanced by Maier,71 however, clearly indicates that
they are out of place in the instant case. The law has recognized the
community of danger in two instances: where, as in the law of average,
all persons within the community are threatened by a common danger
from without,72 and secondly, where, as in a civil law (non-business
partnership), all partners are endangered by all other partners."3 In
the gratuitous driver case, however, there is no "community" other than
a societas leonina: the danger flows solely from one of the persons
concerned.74
2. Limitation of liability by tacit agreement
In full agreement with the decisions of courts and with the pre-
dominant view, we have arrived at the conclusion that, in principle, the
driver of a motor vehicle is liable for all negligent acts toward even a
gratuitous guest. Liability for slight negligence can be excluded by
contract, however, and such a contract can be tacitly concluded.7" In
the instant case, however, this possibility can be readily excluded. Since
X was a minor and was limited in his capacity to make onerous contracts,
he could not have concluded such an agreement without the approval
of his legal representatives, that is, both his parents.7  In view of the
absence of such approval, there can be no contract for the exclusion of
liability for slight negligence.
" RGZ 54, 55; 121, 404; RG, JW 31, 3446; LARENZ, SCHULDRECHT, BONSONDERER
TElL 342 (1956); ERmAN, BGB § 823, comms. 8(d), 9; PALANIYr-GRAMM, BGB
§ 823, comm. 8; RGRK BGB § 823, comm. 6.
70 WUEST, DIE INTERESSENGEMEINSCHAFT, EIN ORDNUNGSPRINZIP DES PRIVATRECHTV
(1958) 5 Pleyer, JZ 59, 167-68.
" Maier, Deutsches Recht 39, 1417.
"' COMMERCIAL CODE § 700 et seg. For the case of causation of the common dan-
ger by a person concerned, see id. § 702.
73 BGB § 708.
7" To the same effect, Guelde, Deutsches Recht, 39, 1420-21.
"
5 See RGZ 67, 431; BGH 8, VRS 7; OLG Cologne, DAR 39, 62.
"BGH, VersR 58, 377; Supreme Constitutional Court, JZ 59, 528.
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3. Assumption of risk
As originally conceived, assumption of risk was a subspecies of con-
tributory negligence which, in accordance with section 254, resulted in
a reduction of the principal wrongdoer's responsibility, especially if the
principal wrongdoer was, as in the case of the holder of animals, subject
to strict liability. Thus, the Supreme Court developed the rule that he
who, in the absence of contract, knowingly and without professional,
moral, or legal obligation, that is, voluntarily, subjects himself to an
avoidable danger, such as boarding a horse-drawn vehicle, must bear
part of the damage resulting therefrom. 7 Since, however, contributory
negligence under section 254 does not require positive knowledge of a
danger but only negligent lack of knowledge thereof,78 the next logical
step was to exclude responsibility completely if the principal wrongdoer
was strictly liable and the victim's contribution to the accident was par-
ticularly substantial.79 This completed the emancipation of the assump-
tion-of-risk rule from the comparative negligence rule."0 Although
assumption of risk was at first limited to cases of strict liability,"' it was
later extended by a landmark decision of the Supreme Court in 1933 to
negligence cases as well. 12  The Court expressly espoused Flad's defi-
nition, generally followed since then by the former and the present
Supreme Court as well as inferior tribunals,83 and concurred in by
authors generally,8 4 that assumption of risk in motor vehicle accident
cases is "the consent of the guest rider, within the scope permissible, to
the possibility of bodily injury to himself, which consent excludes, within
its proper scope, the illegality of the injury and consequently also the
liability of the driver."'85
Thus, in guest-rider cases, assumption of risk is based upon a uni-
lateral declaration of the guest rider that is formally valid only if re-
17RG, JW o6, 349; id. 11, 28.
' EGH 9 VRS 172.
70 RG, 3W iz, 857.
80 See Wangemann, NJW 55, 85.
51RGZ 130, 168. This restrictive view is still maintained by LARENZ, SCHULDRECHT,
ALLGEMEINER TEIL 125 (1953). Contra, Beitzke, MDR 58, 679.
8a RGZ 141, 262.
8 RG, 3W 37, 1633; BGHZ z, x59, 162; BGH, NJW 52, 1410; OLG Hamm, x
VRS 177; 2 VRS 195; 3 VRS 325; OLG Freiburg, VersR 51, 2o6; OLG Oldenburg,
4 VRS 4; OLG Tuebingen, RdK 53, 68; 55, 3o; OLG Cologne, MDR 54, 481; OLG
Bamberg, NJW 49, 506; OLG Nuernberg, VersR 58, 632; OLG Munich, VersR 58, 239.
8'PALANDT-DANCKELMANN, 1GB § 254, comm. 6; FLoEGEL-HARTUNG § 8(a),
comm. 7; MUELLER 298; ENNECCERUS-LEHMANN 72; Groebe, 3W 36, 1581; Goetz
von Boehmer DAR 57, 228-29.
8 Flad, Recht 19, col. 13.
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ceived by the operator of the vehicle. It follows that, inasmuch as the
declaration is equated to ordinary legal declarations, a minor will not,
for the reason stated above, be able to assume risks without the consent
of his guardian. This result has been extensively criticized by legal
commentators who rightly point out the incongruity between issuing a
driver's license to an eighteen-year-old minor and thereby certifying
that he is cognizant of the dangers of road traffic (such as, drunken
driving) and able to avoid them himself, while at the same time main-
taining that the same minor is, as a matter of law, unable to recognize
the same dangers inherent in some other person's driving and to act in
accordance with such knowledge."' A further reason against the appli-
cability of the civil-law declaration test of the assumption of risk is that,
as has been pointed out, the doctrine of assumption of risk was developed
as a subspecies of contributory negligence, and there has never been any
doubt that the minor's capacity to be contributorily negligent in accord-
ance with section 254 of the Civil Code is not equated to his capacity to
contract, but to his capacity in torts, so that an eighteen-year-old minor
has full capacity to be contributorily negligent.87  Finally, it is here
suggested that a fruitful analogy can be drawn to criminal law, where it
is well-established that the capacity of a minor to consent to an otherwise
illegal act is not governed by his capacity to contract, but by his natural
ability to foresee the consequences of his acts. 8
Some opponents of the predominant view, which assimilates the
capacity to assume risks by declaration to the capacity to contract, tend
to avoid the harsh results of this theory by resorting to section 242 of
the Civil Code, which has gradually resulted in imposing a general
requirement of fair dealing in the law of obligations. They argue that
a person who by his own conduct has knowingly placed himself in a
position of danger is thereby estopped from claiming afterwards that
S Wangemann, NJW 55, 185 and MDR 56, 59o-9i; Bochmer, VersR 57,
205-06i MDR 58, 775 JZ 59, 17; Bemmann, VersR 58, 583; Geigel 171 and JZ Si,
59o-9; OLG Oldenburg, DAR 56, 296; Brockmann, Note JW 33, 2389.
87BGB § 828; RGZ 54, 404; id. 59, 2215 id. 68, 423; id. 108, 89; id. i56, 202;
OGH, NJW 50, 905i OLG Schleswig, Schleswig-Holsteinische Anzeigen 57, 97, OLG
Duesseldorf, RDK 55, 1235 OLG Nuernberg, VersR 58, 633; FLOEGEL-HARTUNG § 9,
comm. 95 PALANDT-DANCKELMANN, BGB §254, comm. z(a)i RGRK, BGB §254,
comm. 1(c)5 STAUDINGFP-WERNER BGB § 254, comm. 30; ENNECcERUs-LEHMANN
73; LARENZ, SCHULDRECHT, ALLGEMEINER TEIL 124 (1953).
" Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Strafsachen (Decisions of the Supreme Court
in Penal Cases) 41, 394; 77, 17, 20 [hereinafter cited as RGSt]; Entscheidungen des
Bundesgerichtshofs in Strafsachen 4, 88 [hereinafter cited as BGHSt] ; MAURACH 267;
WELZEL 79-
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he lacked the necessary capacity to act.8" This line of argument would
appear to be fairly conclusive, as it is well-established that the doctrines
of estoppel and abuse of rights operate against minors as well. It is
generally conceded, however, that resort to general clauses such as sec-
tion 242 should be avoided wherever the particular problem can be
solved by resorting to more specialized legal rules. In the instant case,
it is submitted that the analogy to consent in penal cases, and the test of
natural understanding there developed, affords a better solution. First,
such an analogy would further cement the necessary congruence be-
tween civil and criminal law; 90 and second, it would afford a test that,
while not automatic, is nevertheless not difficult to apply and is recog-
nized, in principle, by the Civil Code in section 828, which provides that
persons between seven and eighteen years of age are not liable for their
torts if, at the time the acts were committed, they lacked the ability to
recognize that their acts would entail legal responsibility.
There are, however, substantial arguments against the test here
suggested. For one thing, it is well-settled in civil as well as in penal
law that even a person with full legal capacity cannot consent to an
injury to himself that is contra bonos mores. This especially includes
(consent" even to accidental homicide."' On the other hand, it has
been repeatedly held that the doctrine of assumption of risk is appli-
cable to wrongful death cases. 2 Thus, it would appear that the consent
theory will lead to incorrect results at least in this relatively important
group of cases. It is submitted, however, that such is not the case.
While one cannot legally consent to the specific act that leads to his own
accidental death, a person might very well consent to a pattern of con-
duct that might, by some yet unforeseeable turn of events, result in such
an accidental death. If, as section 276 of the Civil Code provides, con-
sent to the negligence of another is possible, the standard for such negli-
gence clearly cannot be determined by the eventual and largely fortui-
"This view was apparently first expressed by Geigel, JZ 51, 59o-91. See also
GEIGEL ii; OLG Oldenburg, DAR 56, 296S Boehmer, VersR 57, z05-065 JR 57,
338i MDR 58, 77-785 JZ 59, 57; Bemmann, VersR 58, 583i Wangemann, NJW 55, 85,
87 and, with qualifications, MDR 56, 385. The Supreme Court acknowledged that
there are "weighty reasons" for this opinion, but left the question open. BGH, VersR
58, 377-
0 See MAURACH 238; WELZEL 44.
0 1 RGSt 2, 442; RG, JW 25, 2250; BGHSt 4, 88, 93; 7, 117; Supreme Court of
Bavaria, NJW 57, 1245; RGZ 66, 3075 MAURACH 265, 437-38.
"RG, JW 34, 346; OGH 3 VRS iS OLG Hamm, VersR 54, 1295 5 177;5 OLG
Oldenburg, DAR 56, 296.
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t6us outcome in each individual case, but rather has to be determined by
some objective standard. 3
Another objection to the theory here set forth is that it seems to fail
in strict liability cases. As one critic has pointed out, one cannot consent
to the "negligence" of an animal.94 Obviously, the "negligence" of the
animal is not the reason for the strict liability imposed upon its owner.
The problem is that, as the law permits persons to engage in certain
inherently dangerous activities such as operating a railroad or a motor
vehicle or keeping an animal, the carrying on of these dangerous activi-
ties of recognized social utility is lawful as such and therefore not subject
to assumption of risk by "consent" to a tort.95 However, a conceptual
distinction might well be drawn between the creation and establishment
of a source of danger of recognized social utility that is legal, and indi-
vidual manifestations of such danger which, when causing damage to
third parties, create obligations in tort.9 6 Although such torts are not
caused by negligence, it nevertheless seems quite clear that a person
might assume risks by consenting in advance not to the general operation
of the source of danger, but to the specific acts and events which, while
not negligent, nevertheless impose strict liability on the person respon-
sible for the instrumentality or animal.
The result, then, is that X was capable of assuming the risk of the
automobile trip by consenting, either expressly or by implication, to the
dangers resulting therefrom. In the instant case, however, there has
been no such assumption of risk. The mere fact that X accepted trans-
portation as a gratuitous guest is insufficient to constitute implied consent
to risks, for this would merely be a different version of the tacit agree-
ment theory rejected above.97  Similarly, the relation of friendship be-
tween B and X will be insufficient to support, as a matter of law, the
latter's assumption of risks.9 There is surprisingly full uanimity in
judicial opinion and learned comment99 to the effect that a tacit assump-
"Bemmann, VersR 58, 583i WEIZEL So; Kammergericht (Supreme Court of West
Berlin), JR 54, 429.
,Beemmann, VersR 58, 583.
•
9
LARENZ, SCHULDRECHT, BONSONDERER TElL 384-85 (x956) ; MAURACH 434-35.
9 Cf. MAURACH 434 et seq. But see BGHZ 24, zi (en banc).
97 FLOEGEL-HARTUNG § 8 (a), comm. i z.
98 RG, JW 36, 3382; Goetz von Boehmer, DAR 57, 228-29; contra, OLG Schleswig,
DAR 53, 32, reversed by BGH 7 VRS 6.
•"RGZ I28, 129, 232; id. 145, 395; id. 141, 262; RG, DAR 38, So; id. 41 , %o67;
BGHZ 2, i59, 161; id. 22, 1io; BGH, VersR 53, 85; id. 53, 475; id. 54, s61, id. 55,
ix6; d..55, 3095 id. 55, 355; id. 57, 791; id. 58, 309; id. 58, 377, OGH, NJW 5o,
143; DAR 51, 25; 3 VRS 1S; OLG Tuebingen, DAR 52, 6; OLG Hamm, 3 VRS 325,
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tion of risk can only be predicated upon the knowledge of the consenting
person of particular facts increasing the danger of the voyage. Neither
the fact that X was only eighteen years old and therefore had possessed
a driver's license for only a short period,100 nor his venturing out on a
well-traveled super highway,1 1 will be sufficient for this purpose. It
might have been different, however, if the roads had been icy or other-
wise unusually dangerous.
Finally, X's exclamation cannot be regarded as an assumption of
risk.10 2 This would be an entirely artificial construction of a spontaneous
exclamation obviously made without opportunity to weigh the dangers
inherent in the situation.
4. Contributory negligence
X should have realized, however, on due reflection, that his excla-
mation calling the driver's attention to a passing vehicle was likely to
distract the latter's attention from the road and cause an accident.
Therefore, X was contributorily negligent, and his recovery will have
to be diminished, in accordance with section 254 of the Civil Code, by
the degree of his contribution to the accident, in this instance probably
twenty-five per cent. That, however, is a question of fact.
V
SUMMARY
i. A is not liable to X and is liable to Y only on the basis of section
seven of the Road Traffic Law.
2. B is fully liable to Y on the basis of section eighteen of the Road
Traffic Law, as well as section 823, paragraph one, and paragraph two,
in conjunction with section 230 of the Penal Code or section one of the
Road Traffic Regulations.
3. B is liable to X on the basis of section 823, first paragraph, and
second paragraph, in conjunction with section 230 of the Penal Code or
section one of the Road Traffic Regulations, but the extent of his liability
to X is subject to diminution by the degree of the latter's contributory
negligence in accordance with section 254 of the Civil Code.
OLG Karlsruhe, MDR 56, 5505 OLG Oldenburg, DAR 56, 2965 OLG Duesseldorf,
VersR 57, 343; OLG Hamburg, VersR 57, 344; OLG Munich, VersR 58, 2395 OLG
Stuttgart, VersR 58, 4735 FLOECEL-HARTrNG § 8(a), comm. 7; i i. § 9, comm. 155
MUELLER 298; STAUDINGER-WERNER. BGB § 754, comm. 27; Boehmer, VersR 57, 205;
Goetz von Boehmer, DAR 57, 229; Groebe, JW 36, 1583; Wussow 528. BIERMANN,
DAs REICHSHAFTUNGSGESrZ l09 (1956), would appear to be self-contradictory.
..0 FLOEGF-L-HARTUNG § 8(a), comm. 8.
'' Cf. BGH, VersR 56, 388.
102 So held by OLG Munich, VersR 58, 459, for a similar reason.
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LIABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES
I
LIABILITY OF B
According to the majority common-law doctrine, Driver B, having
voluntarily and without compensation undertaken to transport Passen-
ger X as a social guest, is required to exercise the care of a reasonably
prudent man in the management and operation of the automobile. He
is not, however, bound to exercise the highest practicable degree of care,
as in the case of a common carrier. Nor is he held to the stringent lia-
bility of an insurer.' In order to recover damages for his injuries, Pas-
senger X would have the burden of proving that Driver B was negligent
and that his negligence was a proximate cause of his injuries.2 In the
hypothetical case, Driver B would probably be found negligent in per-
mitting his attention to be distracted3 and in swerving to the left side
of the highway.4 Moreover, the requisite causal connection between B's
negligence and X's injury is clearly present.
Even assuming that Driver B were negligent, Passenger X would
be barred from recovery if he were contributorily negligent in asking
the question that momentarily distracted B.' Generally, a guest who
.4 BLASHFIELD, AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE § 2311 (1946). See generally,
White, The Liability of an Auto-inobile Driver to a Nonpaying Passenger, 20 VA. L. REV.
326 (93+).
-Brown-Miller Co. v. Howell, 224 Miss. 136, 79 So. 2d 818 (1955), Lane v.
Bryan, 246 N.C. xo8, 97 S.E.ad 411 0957).
'The distraction of the driver's attention from the operation of his automobile
strongly implies negligence. See Davison v. Davison, 92 N.H. 24.5, 29 A.zd 131
(194z) 5 Hoey v. Solt, 236 S.W.zd 244 (Tex. Ct. App. 195i); Boward v. Leftwich,
197 Va. 227, 89 S.E.zd 32 (1955); Elkey v. Elkey, 234 Wis. 149, 29o N.W. 627
(1940). See also the cases cited in notes x2 & 31, infra, and cases collected in Annot.,
12o A.L.R. 1513 (1939). See Barret, Mechanics of Control and Lookout in Autoino-
bile Law, xi4 TUL. L. REV. 493 (-940).
'Most states have statutes that provide that a motorist must keep to the right and
give an approaching motorist at least one-half of the highway. See Burtchell v. Willey,
147 Me. 339, 87 A.2d 658 (1952) (violation of statute prima facie evidence of negli-
gence) 5 Wallace v. Longest, 226 N.C. x61, 37 S.E.zd I12 (1946) (violation of statute
negligence per se).
'See James, Contributory Negligence, 62 YALE L.J. 691, 705 (x953), who says:
"In an atmosphere where the importance of fault itself is waning, contributory negligence
will be bound to meet with rapidly mounting disfavor .... [C]ontributory negligence is
well on its way to becoming a dead letter, except as juries illicitly apply it to diminish
a plaintiff's recovery." See also, Mechem, The Contributory Negligence of Automobile
Passengers, 78 U. PA. L. REV. 736 (1930); Note, ii W. RES. L. REv. 109 (1959).
The fact that a joint enterprise exists between a driver and his passenger will not pre-
vent the passenger's recovering damages from the driver for injuries resulting from the
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engages the driver in conversation or who asks him some question is
not, as a matter of law, contributorily negligent if the driver abandons
his observation of the road for the purpose of answering the question.
However, where the conversation is of an engrossing nature and is likely
to distract the driver, the guest by initiating or participating in such a,
conversation might be contributorily negligent.6 There is virtual uni-
formity in holding that the burden of pleading and proving contributory
negligence is upon the defendant,' although a few jurisdictions hold that
the plaintiff must prove that he was not negligent.8 Because Passenger
X's question was of a type that might foreseeably distract B, it is prob-
able that a jury would find X contributorily negligent and would render
a verdict in favor of B.9
Another common-law view renders the driver liable to his invited.
social guest only for injuries resulting from the 'former's gross negli-.
gence. This rule was first set forth in the leading case of Massaletti v.
Fitzroy,"0 in which the court analogized the driver-guest relationship.
to a gratuitous bailment. The doctrine gained very limited acceptance,.
however5 and among those states that have no guest statutes, it is in,
effect today only in Massachusetts and Georgia." Whether Passenger
driver's negligence. If a joint enterprise is established between driver and passenger,
however, the negligence of the driver is imputed to the passenger, thus preventing the
passenger's recovering from a third person for injuries resulting from the concurring-
negligence of the driver and the third person. Under the supposed facts, Driver B and
Passenger X were not engaged in a joint enterprise since both of the following requi-
sites did not exist: (i) a mutual interest in the objectives of the ride, and (z) a mutual
right of control over the operation of the vehicle. 5 A AM. JUR. Automobiles §§ 826-
28 0956).
84 BLASHFIRLD, op. cit. supra note x, § 2431.
'King v. Brindley, 255 Ala. 425, 51 So. 7d 870 (i95i) ; Welch v. Moothart, 89"
So. 2d 485 (Fla. 1956).
" Jacobson v. Aldrich, 246 Iowa 116o, 68 N.W.ad 733 (1955)5 Irish v. Clark, 149,
Me. 152, 99 A.2d 290 (953).
0 State v. Brandau, 176 Md. 584, 6 A.2d 233 0939) (directed verdict for defendant
affirmed since the question of guest was asked under such circumstances as would naturally
tend suddenly to distract the attention of the driver at a time when imminent danger was
present) 5 Campbell v. Campbell, 316 Pa. 331, 175 Atl. 407 (1934) (jury found guest
contributorily negligent in distracting motorist by discussing papers with him relating
to the driver's admission to college). Cf. Sweeney v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., 184 So.
740 (La. Ct. App. 1938) 5 Kirby v. Keating, 271 Mass. 390, 171 N.E. 671 (1930)
(jury found that guest who asked driver the time was not contributorily negligent when
driver ran off road while looking at his watch).
10 228 Mass. 487, 118 N.E. 168(1917).
" Cobb v. Coleman, 94 Ga. App. 86, 93 S.E.ad 8oi (1956); Marshall v. August,.
155 N.E.ad Soo (Mass. 1959).
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X could make out a prima facie case of gross negligence would depend
upon such elements as the length of time that B's attention was dis-
tracted, the speed of the automobile, and the existence of any imminent
danger at the time of the distraction. 2 Since B was only momentarily
distracted, he probably would not be grossly negligent as a matter of
law. However, if it were established that B was guilty of gross negli-
gence, X would be barred from recovery if he were contributorily
negligent.13
The common-law liability of a driver to his guest has been super-
seded in twenty-seven states by guest statutes, which provide that the
driver is liable to his guest only for an extreme departure from ordinary
care.14 These statutes, which are not uniform in their terminology, limit
the liability of the driver to one or a combination of the following types
of misconduct: gross negligence, heedless and reckless misconduct, wan-
ton or willful misconduct, intentional infliction of harm, and intoxica-
tion.-5 The impetus for the enactment of these statutes was the feeling
that it was unjust to permit one who is a recipient of the driver's hospi-
tality, and who confers no tangible benefit upon the driver, to recover
damages for his ordinary negligence.' It was also felt that such statutes
were necessary to prevent insurance companies from being defrauded in
collusive suits between guest and host.1 7
Guest statutes generally have been sustained against the challenge
that they violate the due process clause.' However, those statutes
attempting to relieve a driver from all liability to his guest, whatever
12 Chastain v. Lawton, 87 Ga. App. 35, 73 S.E.zd 38 (195z) (motorist who looked
to rear for 3 to 5 seconds while traveling at 30 to 35 miles per hour on heavily traveled
thoroughfare held grossly negligent) ; Dinardi v. Herook, 3z8 Mass. 572, 205 N.E.zd
197 (195z) ; Roy v. Roy, ioi N.H. 88, 133 A.2d 492 (-957).
13 Oast v. Mopper, 58 Ga. App. 506, 299 S.E. 249 (1938); Oppenheim v. Barkin,
26z Mass. z±8, i59 N.E. 6z8 (1928).
"A few of these are: CAL. VEHICLE CODE 17%58 (1959); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-9- (953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 320.59 (1958); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4515.92
(Baldwin 1953) ; TEx. REv. CIV. STAT, art. 67o1b (2960).
1 See generally, 2 HARPER & JAMES, ToRTs 95o-62 (1956); Weber, Guest Statutes,
II U. CINC. L. REV. 24 (937); Notes, 54 Nw. U.L. REV. 263 (11959); 34 IND. L.J.
338 (1959); 8 W. REs. L. REV. ±70 (1957).
" See Crawford v. Foster, iio Cal. App. 8i, 293 Pac. 841, 843 (1930). See also,
Sullivan v. Davis, -63 Ala. 685, 83 So. 2d 434 (1955).
"Naphtali v. Lafazan, 7 Misc. 2d 1057, 165 N.Y.S.zd 395 (i957)5 Kitchens v.
Duffiield, 149 Ohio St. 500, 79' N.E.d 906 (1948).
18 See Silver v. Silver, ±8o U.S. 17, 123 (2929); Pickett v. Matthews, 238 Ala.
542, 19Z So. 26z (1939) ; Gallegher v. Davis, 37 Del. 380, 283 At. 62o (1936).
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the degree of negligence, 9 or to hold the driver liable only for inten-
tional2" injuries have been held unconstitutional.
Because an occupant of a motor vehicle is a guest if he rides for his
own pleasure or on his own business and confers no benefits upon his
host other than the pleasure of his company, 2' Passenger X, in a guest-
statute jurisdiction, would be governed in his claim against Driver B
by the terms of the statute. Judicial attempts to define the ambit of
liability under these statutes have been characterized by disagreement
and confusion. Gross negligence is defined by some courts as but a
greater degree of negligence than ordinary negligence.22 Another view
holds that the difference is one of kind, gross negligence being synony-
mous with wanton and willful misconduct.23 Some courts have equated
heedless or reckless misconduct with gross negligence,24 while others
have given it the same meaning as wanton or willful misconduct.25
Willful misconduct, although it has been held to be synonymous with
gross negligence, 26 usually requires a positive intention to inflict harm. 7
Wanton misconduct is variously said to be something less than willful
injury,2 to be synonymous with willful misconduct,29 and to signify an
even higher degree of culpability than willful action.30
1' Coleman v. Rhodes, 35 Del. izo, x59 At. 649 (1932) i Stewart v. Honk, 127 Ore.
589, 271 Pac. 998 (1928).
2OLudwig v. Johnson, 243 Ky. 533, 49 S.W.2d 347 (1932). Cf. Shea v. Olson,
185 Wash. 143, 53 P.zd 61S (1936).
21 Illustrative cases holding the occupant a guest are: Kroiss v. Butler, 129 Cal. App.
7d 550, 777 P.zd 873 (1954); Sabo v. Main, 103 Ohio App. 113, 144 N.E.zd 248
(1956). Cases holding that the occupant was not a guest are: Martinez v. Southern
Pac. Ry., 45 Cal. 7d 244, 288 P.2d 868 (1955)i Milkovich v. Bune, 371 Pa. 15, 89
A.2d 320 (1952). See 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 958-62 (1956) ; Note, 27 VA. L.
REV. 559 (941).
22Conway v. O'Brien, 312 U.S. 492 (94i) Olson v. Shellington, 167 Neb. 564,
94 N.W.2d 20 (1959).
2" Hamilton v. Peoples, 38 Tenn. App. 385, 274 S.W.2d 630 (i954) Froh v. Hein,
76 N.D. 701, 39 N.W.zd ix (1949). See Note, 4 U. FLA. L. REv. 79 (1951) ; Note,
33 ORE. L. REV. 216 (1954).
"Rogers v. Blake, 15o Tex. 373, 240 S.W.2d xool (1951).
"2Harlow v. Van Dusen, 137 Cal. App. 2d 547, 290 P.zd 91 (-955); Fowler v.
Franklin, 58 N.M. 254, 270 P.2d 389 (i954).
2 Carraway v. Revell, 112 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1959).
"fDe Loss v. Lewis, 78 Cal. App. 2d 223, 177 P.zd 589 (1947) ; Usselton v. Carvey,
169 Ohio St. 142, x58 N.E.zd 19o (1956). See Appleman, Wilful and Wanton Con-
duct in Automobile Guest Cases, 13 IND. L.J. 131 (1937)5 Green, Illinois Negligence
Law, Wilful and Wanton Negligence, 39 ILL. L. REV. 197 (1945).
" Long v. Foley, i8o Kan. 83, 299 P.zd 63 (956).
"Eikenberry v. Neher, 126 Ind. App. 571, 134 N.E.zd 710 (.956).
30 Pettingell v. Moede, 129 Colo. 484, 271 P.2d 1038 (i954).
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Whatever judicial interpretation is given the degree of negligence
required under the guest statute, all courts agree that momentary in-
attention will not nullify the driver's statutory protection .3  But, if
Driver B's attention were diverted for a substantial length of time, he
might be liable for X's injuries.2
If B's conduct were regarded as gross negligence, a majority of the
courts would hold that the passenger's contributory negligence would
bar recovery. 3  If, however, B would be liable only for recklessness,
or willful and wanton misconduct, contributory negligence would not
bar recovery 34 unless it involved recklessness, or willful and wanton
misconduct. 5
These statutes have been severely criticized for failing to prevent
collusion between driver and passenger, for placing an economic burden
upon the community that provides gratuitous medical care for indigent
guests, and for relieving the negligent driver of the moral obligation
to care for his injured guest."0 Such statutes, being in derogation of
the common law, are strictly construed against the host and liberally
in favor of the guest. In an effort to avoid the harshness of the
" The distraction of the driver did not render him liable to his guest in the following
cases: Davis v. Klaiber, 229 F.zd 883 (6th Cir. x956) (leaning over to light cigar) i
Desch v. Reeves, 163 F. Supp. 213 (M.D.N.C. 1958) (looking to the side at a truck) ;
Winn v. Ferguson, 132 Cal. App. 2d 539, 282 P.2d 5x5 (1955) (diverting attention to
child climbing about in automobile) i Bashor v. Bashor, 103 Colo. 232, 85 P.zd 732
(1938) (manipulating radio dial) 5 Sayre v. Malcom, 139 Kan. 378, 31 P.2d 8 (x934)
(driving with eyes off road for 75 feet). For cases in guest statute jurisdictions
predicated upon the defendant's automobile being on the wrong side of the road see
Annot., 136 A.L.R. iz56 (1942).
" Farrey v. Bettendorf, 96 So. 7d 889 (Fla. 1957) i Gustason v. Vernon, x65 Neb.
745, 87 N.W.2d 395 (.958).
"Carter v. Carter, 63 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 1953); Koster v. Matson, 139 Kan. 124,
30 P.zd 107 (x934).
"Loomis v. Church, 76 Idaho 87, 277 P.zd 561 (1954.); Bohnsack v. Driftmier,
243 Iowa 383, 52 N.W.zd 79 (1952). Contra, Schiller v. Rice, x'5 Tex. x16, 246
S.W.2d 607 (952).
" Laux v. Kummer, 342 Ill. App. 448, 96 N.E.2d 828 (1951) ; Pierce v. Clemens,
113 Ind. App. 65, 46 N.E.2d 836 (1943).
36 Note, 27 GEo. L.J. 624, 628-29 (939). White, supra note x, at 333, 335,
points out: "The charge of perjury and collusion between the driver and passenger is
a matter peculiarly for the criminal courts. It furnishes no sound reason for altering
the substantive rights and duties of the driver and passenger. . . . [I]t is doubtful that
the responsibility for these legislative monstrosities can entirely be escaped by either the
courts or bar." For a biting criticism, see Tipton, Florida's Automobile Goest Statute,
ii U. FLA. L. REV. 287, 299 (x958).
"Green v. Jones, 136 Colo. 512, 319 P.2d 2o83 (1957); Clinger v. Duncan, 166
Ohio St. 216, 14 N.E.2d 156 (-957).
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statutes, some courts have tended to narrow the group of passengers to
whom the guest statutes apply or to find the degree. of negligence neces-
sary to render the driver liable to be scarcely greater than that of ordi-
nary negligence.38
Since Driver B was undoubtedly negligent in allowing his attention
to be distracted 0 and in swerving to the left side of the highway, 0 he
would be liable to Driver Y, with whom he collided, since his negligence
was a proximate cause of Y's injuries. Obviously, Y was not contribu-
torily negligent since a motorist traveling in a lawful manner on the
right side of the road may assume that one approaching from the oppo-





According to the common law, an automobile owner4 2 is not liable to
third parties for injuries caused by the operator of the vehicle merely
because of a parent-child4 3 or bailor-bailee 44 relationship. However, a
parent who permits his child to use an automobile might be liable for
injuries caused by the child's negligent operation of the vehicle under
one of the following theories: (i) entrustment of the vehicle to an
incompetent or reckless driver; (2) the doctrine of respondeat saperior;
(3) the family-purpose doctrine; (4) statutory liability; or (5) the
dangerous instrumentality doctrine.
" See Note, 13 WAsH. & LEE L. REV. 84, 91 (1956) 5 Note, 54 Nw. U.L. REV. 263
(1959) i Note, 5 KAN. L. REV. 722 (-957).
a See note 3 supra.
,o See note 4. supra.
"Globe Cereal Mills v. Scrivener, 24o F.zd 330 (oth Cir. 1956); Peeples v. Dob-
son, 99 So. ad 161 (La. Ct. App. 1957) 5 Lucas v. White, 248 N.C. 38, 102 S.E.zd 387
(1958).
2 In the hypothetical fact situation, A's ownership of the automobile is stated. How-
.ever, the fact that the automobile was registered in A's name would establish a presump-
tion in some jurisdictions that he was the owner. See Annot., 103 A.L.R. 138 (1936).
"'Bonner v. Surman, 215 Ark. 301, 220 S.W.2d 431 (1949) ; Hartough v. Brint,
1o Ohio App. 350, 14o N.E.2d 3- (1955). In Louisiana, however, "the father, or
after his decease, the mother, are responsible for the damage occasioned by their minor
-or unemancipated children, residing with them.. .. " LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2318
(Dart 1945). See Honeycutt v. Carver, 25 So. zd 99 (La. Ct. App. 1946).
"Graham v. Shilling, 533 Colo. 5, z9 P.zd 396 (1955); Dean v. Ketter, 328 Ill.




According to the entrustment doctrine, recovery by Passenger X or
Driver Y from Owner A would be dependent upon establishing that A
was personally negligent in entrusting his automobile to one whom he
knew, or should have known, was an incompetent or reckless driver,
and that the alleged incompetence or recklessness was a proximate cause
of the injury.45 In a guest-statute jurisdiction, X might also have to
establish that B was guilty of the statutory degree of negligence.40 If
these elements were established, the fact that the accident occurred at
a place where B had been forbidden to drive would not relieve A from
liability because, under the entrustment doctrine, "the responsibility of
the owner will follow the continued operation of the vehicle even
though such operation is beyond the scope of permission."47 This doc-
trine is predicated upon the owner's original act of entrusting the auto-
mobile to an incompetent, this being a negligent act in the causal se-
quence.
Since, under the supposed facts, B previously neither had been in an
automobile accident nor had given A any reason to doubt his care and
prudence, A was not personally negligent in entrusting his automobile
to B. Therefore, A would not be liable under the entrustment doctrine
to either Passenger X or Driver Y.
B. Respondeat Superior
The doctrine of respondeat s perior might, however, render Owner
A vicariously liable if he occupied a master-servant relationship with B
at the time of the accident. This would also necessitate finding that B
was acting within the scope of his employment.48 While the mere rela-
" F.B. Walker & Sons v. Rose, 223 Miss. 494, 78 So. zd 592 (1955); Saunders v.
Prue, 235 Mo. App. 1245, 151 S.W.zd 478 (x94±). See Annot., 168 A.L.R. 1364
(1947). See generally, Note, 4 DRAKE L. REv. 98 (x955).
O 0rtman v. Smith, 198 F.zd 123 (8th Cir. 1952); Benton v. Sloss, 38 Cal. 2d
399, 240 P.2d 575 (952), 21 U. CINC. L. REV. 93 (x952). Contra, Williams v.
Husted, 54 N.E.2d 165 (Ohio Ct. App. 1943).
"Gulla v. Straus, 154 Ohio St. 193, 2001 93 N.E.zd 662, 666 (xg5o). See also,
Krausnick v. Haegg Roofing Co., 236 Iowa 985, 2o N.W.2d 432 (19t5).
,' See generally, 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 1374-92 (1956) ; MECHEM, AGENCY,
237-45, 256-65 ( 4 th ed. 957.). In the following cases the court found an agency rela-
tionship between parent and child: Catanzaro v. McKay, 277 S.W.zd 566 (Mo. -955)
(son running errand for father)i Irvine v. Killen, 1o9 Pa. Super. 34, x65 Ad. S29
(1933) (mother receiving wages of son who drove her automobile to work); Cotterly
v. Muirhead, .44 S.W.2d 92o (Tex. Civ. App. ±95i) (son driving himself and his sister
to school) i Kichefsky v. Wiatrzykowski, 1x Wis. 3I9, 2io, N.W. 679 (x926) (father
sending son to buy a new hat). Compare cases in note 5x infra, in which no agency
relationship existed between parent and child.
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tionship of parent and child does not establish an agency relationship,"
in some jurisdictions the fact that A owned the automobile would raise
a rebuttable presumption that B was driving the automobile as A's agent
and that B was acting within the scope of his agency." Should such a
presumption of agency arise, it could easily be overcome because B was
engaged in a trip solely for his own purpose and pleasure and obviously
was not an agent acting within the scope of his employment.5
C. The Family Purpose Doctrine
The difficulty in holding the parent liable under the orthodox con-
cept of agency for the injuries inflicted by the negligent operation of his
automobile by a financially irresponsible minor often left an uncom-
pensated victim. The parent thus escaped liability even though he
could have controlled the use of the automobile, was more able to pay
the damages than was the minor, and could have insured the risk. Judi-
cial dissatisfaction with parental immunity prompted approximately one-
half of the states to adopt the family purpose or family car doctrine.
This doctrine, an extension of the rules of the master-servant relation-
ship, is based on the theory that the head of the family, by furnishing
an automobile for the pleasure and convenience of his family, makes
the pleasure of the family his business. Therefore, when a member of
the family drives the automobile for his own pleasure, he is engaged
in the business of the head of the household and is acting as a servant,
thus making the head of the household liable for the torts resulting
from the operation of the vehicle.52
"Hartough v. Brint, ioi Ohio App. 350, 14o N.E.zd 34 (x955); Fielding v.
Dickinson, 2o4 Okla. 372, 230 P.2d 466 (-95-).
"O°MECHEM, AGENCY, 328-330 (4th ed. 195z). Wigmore advocates such a pre-
sumption because of "the relative facility of proof as between the parties, the ordinary
habits of owners of vehicles, and the wisdom of placing the risk of not obtaining evi-
dence upon the person who owns a valuable and dangerous apparatus and therefore
should take special precaution against its misuse by irresponsible persons." 9 WiGMORF,
EVIDENCE 400 (3d ed. 1940). See Comment, z BAYLOR L. REV. 432 (1950 ) 5 Note, 4
VAND. L. REv. 151 (1950).
"' "A servant is a person employed to perform services in the affairs of another and
who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the services is subject to
the other's control or right to control." RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § z2o(1).
In the following cases no agency relationship was found between parent and child:
Bonner v. Surman, 215 Ark. 301, 2zo S.W.zd 431 (1949) (son using mother's auto-
mobile to deliver papers) 5 Schuth v. Kuntz, 346 Ill. App. 334, 1o5 N.E.2d 523 (1952)
(son taking sister and grandmother to church) ; Haskey v. Williams, 36o Pa. 78, 6o
A.2d 32 (1948) (daughter on way to college to obtain her clothes) ; Ebner v. Gandy,
138 Tex. 295, 158 S.W.2d 989 (1942) (son driving with mother to football game).
52 2 HARPER & JAME, TORTS 1419-20 (1956). Some of the pioneer cases setting
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To recover under the family purpose doctrine, the aggrieved party
must establish (i) that the head of the household had a property interest
in the automobile; (2) that the automobile was provided for family use;
(3) that a familial relationship existed between the operator and the
head of household; (4) that the operator had permission to use the
automobile; and (5) that at the time of the accident the automobile
was being operated for one of the permissive uses for which it was
intended. 3 In the hypothetical case, Passenger X or Driver Y could
easily satisfy these requirements by establishing that A's automobile was
frequently used by his wife and son, B, and that A had given B permis-
sion to use the vehicle on the night of the accident.
Whether the fact that Driver B was driving on the super highway,
where A had forbidden him to drive, would relieve A from liability
under the family-purpose doctrine would probably be decided on the
same principles as a servant's deviation from the scope of his employ-
ment. Courts generally have held that the head of the family is not
relieved from liability if a member of his family does not obey in detail
his instructions as to the time, place, and manner of driving 4  In a
few jurisdictions, however, liability is not imposed where there is a
substantial departure from the consent or instructions given as to the
use of the vehicle." It would seem that, in the hypothetical case, B's
deviation, although a substantial departure from A's instructions, should
not prevent A's being held liable. Otherwise, "the purposes of this
doctrine would be destroyed entirely if a father could relieve himself
of responsibility by specific instructions known only to himself and his
son..)"5 6
The family purpose doctrine has been aptly described as "an ille-
gitimate child of the law ... accepted only out of social necessity and
forth this doctrine are: Benton v. Regeser, zo Ariz. 273, 179 Pac. 966 (1959)
Hutchins v. Haffner, 63 Co1. 365, 167 Pac. 966 (1917); Griffin v. Russel, 144 Ga.
275, 87 S:E. io (i916) 5 King v. Smythe, i4o Tenn. 217, zo4 S.W. 296 (1918). See
cases collected in Annot., 132 A.L.R. 981 (-94). See generally, Lattin, Vicarious
Liability and the Family Automobile, 26 MIcH. L. REV. 846 (1928); McCall, The
Family Automobile, 8 N.C.L. REV. 256 (1930).
"Lattin, supra note 52, at 861.
"' Evans v. Caldwell, 184 Ga. 203, 19o S.E. 587 (1937); First-City Bank & Trust
Co. v. Doggett, 316 S.W.zd 225 (Ky. 1958), 48 Ky. L.J. %69 (x959) in which the
author contends that in Kentucky, consent as a prerequisite to liability under the family
purpose doctrine has virtually been eliminated; Jones v. Cook, 96 W. Va. 60, 123 S.E.
407 (1924). See also, Comment, 22 TENN. L. REV. 535, 541-42 (1952).
" Costanzo v. Sturgill, 14.5 Conn. 92, 139 A.zd 51 (1958); Vaughn v. Booker, 217
N.C. 479, 8 S.E.2d 603 (1940).
"
0 Turner v. Hall's Adm'x, 252 S.W.2d 30, 32, (Ky. 1952).
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then rationalized by means of legal fictions."57  It has been rejected by
many courts that feel the principles of the master-servant relationship
cannot be extended to hold that a member of the family using the car
for pleasure, the purpose intended by the head of the household, be-
comes the agent of the head of the household.58 Although one must
admit that the principles of agency have been distorted, "the practical
administration of justice between the parties is more the duty of the
court than the preservation of some esoteric theory concerning the law
of principal and agent."59 To impose liability on the parent, who in
many instances is covered by an omnibus clause in his liability insurance
policy, justifiably achieves a desirable social result.00
D. Statutory Liability
At least seven jurisdictions 1 have statutes that extend the doctrine
of respondeat superior by making the vehicle owner liable for injuries
caused by the negligent operation of his vehicle on the highway by
one to whom he has given either express or implied permission to
drive. 2 In effect, these statutes make one who uses an automobile with
the owner's consent the agent of the owner and dispense with the com-
mon-law requirement of actual agency as a condition of the owner's
liability. The purpose of these consent statutes is to protect innocent
third parties and to prevent an owner's escaping liability on the ground
"Note, 38 Ky. L.J. 156 (949).
"Trice v. Bridgewater, xz5 Tex. 75, 81 S.W.2d 63 (935); Hackley v. Robey,
170 Va. 55, 195 S.E. 689 (1938) 5 Van Blaricom v. Dodgson, zzo N.Y. 111, 115 N.E.
443 ('9,7).
"King v. Smythe, 14o Tenn. 217, zzz, 2o4 S.W. 296, 298 (1918). Prosser says,
"It probably is to be regarded as the adoption of a fiction, and as merely a partial and
inadequate step in the direction of an ultimate rule which will hold the owner of the
car liable in all cases for the negligence of the driver to whom he entrusts it." PROSSER,
ToRTS 371 (zd ed. 1955).
"Although several jurisdictions which once accepted the family purpose doctrine
now reject it, there appears to be no definite trend toward either general acceptance or
rejection of this doctrine. See Sare v. Stetz, 67 Wyo. 55, 214 P.2d 486 (i95o), in
which the doctrine was rejected. See also Burns v. Main, 87 F. Supp. 705 (D. Alaska
1950), in which the doctrine was accepted.
"l CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 17150 (i959) 5 D.C. CODE ANN. § 40-403 (1951) 5 IOWA
CODE ANN. § 321.493 (Supp. 1959) 5 MICH. COmP. LAWS § z57.401 (Supp. 1956)5
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 170.54 (1946) ; N.Y. VEHICLE & TRAFFIC LAWS § 595 R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 31-31-3 (1956).
"See generally, Brodsky, Motor Vehicle Ownaers' Statutory Vicarious Liability in
Rhode Island, 19 B.U.L. REv. 448 (1939) ; Note, 21 MINN. L. REv. 823 (1937). For
a survey of European legislation, see Deak, Liability and Compensation for Automobile
Accidents, z1 MINN. L. REV. 123 (1937). Cases are collected in Annot., 135 A.L.R.
481 (194).
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that his automobile was being used without his consent or not on the
owner's business.63
These statutes have been upheld as a valid exercise of the state
police power.64 However, a statute that imposed liability upon the
owner even though his automobile was taken without his consent or
knowledge has been held to violate due process.65 Since these statutes
are in derogation of the common law, they are usually strictly con-
strued.6" However, a few courts have held that they should be liberally
construed in order to carry out their purpose. 7
Under these consent statutes, it is almost invariably held that the
owner is not liable if the operation of the automobile at the time of the
accident was not, as to place, within the terms of the consent.68 Thus,
Owner A would not be liable under the consent statutes to Passenger
X or Driver Y because A had specifically instructed Driver B not to
drive on the super highway.
In several jurisdictions, the scope of liability under the consent
statutes is limited by guest statutes under which the owner is liable to
the driver's guest only if the driver is guilty of the type of misconduct
set forth in the guest statute.6 Thus, if the court applied the consent
B3 furgess v. Cahill, 26 Cal. 2d 320, 158 P.2d 393 (1945) 5 Parker v. Telesco,
i N.Y.S.zd 481 (.95z).
"'Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253 (1933)5 Manica v. Smith, 138 Cal. App. 695,
33 P.zd 418 0934). In Stapleton v. Independent Brewing Co., 198 Mich. 17o, 175,
164 N.W. 520, 521 (1917), the court said: "The owner of an automobile is supposed
to know, and should know, about the qualifications of the persons he allows to use his
car, to drive his automobile, and if he has doubts of the competency or carefulness of
the driver he should refuse to give his consent to the use by him of the machine. The
statute is within the police power of the states."
"
5Daugherty v. Thomas, 174 Mich. 371, 14o N.W. 61S (9,3).
'aMiller v. Berman, 55 Cal. App. zd 569, 131 P.2d x8 (1942); Geib v. Slater,
320 Mich. 316, 3 N.W.2d 65 (948).
"
7 Bayless v. Mull, So Cal. App. zd 66, 122 P.zd 6o8 (1942)5 Frye v. Anderson,
248 Minn. 478, 8o N.W.2d 593 (1957).
" Henrietta v. Evans, io Cal. 2d 526, 75 P.2d 1o5i (1938)5 Rowland v. Spalti,
196 Iowa zo8, z94 N.W. 90 (1923); Kieszkowski v. Odlewany, 280 Mich. 388, 273
N.W. 741 (1937), 24 MINN. L. REV. 271 (1940). See cases collected in Annot., 159
A.L.R. 1309, 1323 (1945). See Note, 26 MARQ. L. REV. 39 (1941). For the position
of the California courts when the bailee violates the owner's instructions see Note, 7
STAN. L. REv. 507, 517-28 0955).
"CAL. VEHICLE CODE §§ 17150, 17158 (i959). In California, however, willful
misconduct is imputed to the owner only if there is an actual agency relationship be-
tween owner and driver. See Benton v. Sloss, 38 Cal. 2d 399, 240 P.2d 575 (1952);
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 3z'.493, 321.494 (1949) ; White v. Center, 218 Iowa 1027, 254
N.W. 90 (1934). MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.401 (Supp. 1956), interpreted in Peyton
v. Delany, 348 Mich. 238, 83 N.W.2d 204 (1957).
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statute despite the deviation from A's instructions as to place of opera-
tion, A would be liable to Passenger X only if B were guilty of the
degree of negligence required under the guest statute.
The fact that B was eighteen years of age would be of great signifi-
cance in some jurisdictions in determining A's liability. There are
statutes to the effect that a minor under eighteen years of age who
applies for an operator's license must have his parent sign his applica-
'tion.7 ' The parent thereby becomes liable for the licensee's negligence
or willful misconduct in the operation of the vehicle until the minor
attains the prescribed age.7 1  There are also statutes to the effect that
the owner of an automobile who permits a minor under a prescribed
age to operate the vehicle shall be jointly and severally liable with the
minor for the latter's negligence. Neither type of statute could be
invoked against A since B was eighteen and thus beyond the prescribed
age.
E. The Dangerous Instrumentality Doctrine
Florida has applied the so-called dangerous instrumentality doctrine
to automobiles. This doctrine provides that when an owner authorizes
and permits another to use his automobile, he is liable for injuries to
third persons caused by its negligent operation.73 Under this doctrine,
the fact that B deviated from A's instructions would not absolve A of
liability since in Florida "knowledge and consent of the owner of the
"See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-315 (x957); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 61o5
(1953) i OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4507.07 (Page 1954); Ws. STAT. § 343.15 (.957).
See cases collected in Annot., z6 A.L.R.zd 1320 (1952). It has been held that the adult
who signs the application for the license is liable to the minor's guest only if the minor
is guilty of the degree of negligence set forth in the guest statute. See McHugh v.
Brown, So Del. 154, 125 A.2d 583 (1956) ; Tighe v. Diamond, 149 Ohio St. 520, 80
N.E.2d 122 (1948).
"x Carter v. Graves, 230 Miss. 463, 93 So. 2d L77 (1957) i Garret v. Lyden, x61
Ohio St. 385, 119 N.E.zd 289 (954).
'2See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-417 (1956)5 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 2I,
§ 61o6 (Supp. 1958) 5 KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-222 (1949). It has been held that
the guest statute is not applicable to this situation and that the owner is liable for the
ordinary negligence of the minor. See Bisoni v. Carlson, 171 Kan. 631, 237 P.2d o4
(1951), 1 U. KAN. L. REV. 368 ('953).
"Leonard v. Susco Car Rental System of Fla., 1o3 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1958); Lynch
v. Walker, 159 Fla. ,88, 31 So. 2d 268 (1947) 5 Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson,
So Fla. 441,, 86 So. 629 (gzo). This doctrine has now been recognized by legislative
enactment, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 51.12 (Supp. 1959). See Note, 5 U. FLA. L. REV. 41z
(1952).
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use of an automobile on the highway by another imposes liability for
the negligent operation of it, no matter where the driver goes."7 4
A would not be liable to Passenger X, however, unless B were guilty
of gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct as set forth in
the Florida guest statute.7h The principal factor in determining whether
B was grossly negligent would be the length of time that he was dis-
tracted as "a momentary diversion ... would not constitute gross negli-
gence but if such diversion from the way ahead is for a substantial length
of time, such conduct would demonstrate an obvious lack of slight care
which would bring it within the area of negligence defined as gross."7 0
Since B was only momentarily distracted, Owner A would not be liable
to X under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. He would, how-
ever, be liable to Y.
"' Cropper v. U.S., 8z F. Supp. 8i, 8z (N.D.Fla. 1948). See also, Boggs v. Butler,
129 Fla. 324, 176 So. 174 (1937).
Koger v. Hollahan, 144 Fla. 779, 198 So. 685 (1940).
Farrey v. Bettendorf, 96 So. 2d 889, 895 (Fla. 1957).
